CVE-2026-9771 evidence review
zephyrproject zephyr
The flash_copy() system call is verified by z_vrfy_flash_copy() in drivers/flash/flash_util.c. On builds with CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled, this handler is the kernel-side trust boundary for a user-mode caller. Prior to the fix it validated only the output buffer (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE) and passed the two struct device * arguments, src_dev and dst_dev, directly into the implementation without any object validation — unlike every sibling flash syscall, which guards its device pointer with K_SYSCALL_DRIVER_FLASH. A user-mode thread fully controls the values of src_dev/dst_dev and the contents of...
This record remains available for product and version identification, but it is not presented as a complete remediation procedure. Confirm the affected range and the supported fix in a direct vendor advisory before changing production systems.
Identify the product and installed version
Record whether zephyrproject zephyr is present, where it is installed, and which interfaces are exposed.
- Record the product name, package or appliance identifier, and installed version.
- Identify internet-facing, administrative, API, and internal access paths.
- Preserve the pre-change configuration and relevant service logs.
Compare the affected range
Use the current record as an identification aid: >= 4.0.0 < 4.4.2. Resolve incomplete inventory results before deciding that an asset is unaffected.
Verify the authoritative remediation source
Open the linked source material and locate a direct vendor advisory for this CVE. Confirm the supported fixed release and product-specific update path before making a production change.
Operational boundary
This page does not replace the vendor advisory, support contract, change-management process, or recovery plan. Do not infer that an asset is unaffected from an incomplete inventory query or a missing fixed-version field.