CVE-2026-77776
Headroom Labs Headroom
Headroom's LLM proxy derives the memory owner from the x-headroom-user-id request header. The header is read directly at several points in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py, including the chat completion and websocket paths, and nothing binds the value to the caller. A client can therefore name another user's identifier and read or write that user's stored LLM memory. The fix introduces a single resolve_memory_identity seam in headroom/proxy/identity.py that honors the header only for loopback or allowlisted callers and otherwise binds the identity to the proxy-token fingerprint or the oper...
- CVSS
- 9.3
- EPSS
- - - percentile
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Published
- 2026.08.21